均值-方差准则下具有共同噪声的竞争保险公司的时间一致纳什均衡

Time-Consistent Nash Equilibrium for Competitive Insurers with Common Noise under Mean-Variance Criterion

  • 摘要: 本文研究多家竞争型保险公司的终端财富相对业绩在均值-方差准则下最优投资与风险控制问题,刻画时间一致平稳纳什均衡策略。其中,保险公司盈余过程采用共同噪声驱动的复合泊松跳-扩散模型描述,每家保险公司通过选择最优投资和风险控制策略实现均值-方差准则下相对财富最大化。具体而言,我们首先求解有限家保险公司博弈的平稳纳什均衡策略,进而采用平均场博弈方法推导保险公司数量趋于无穷时的平均场均衡。最后,数值讨论了市场模型参数对纳什均衡策略的影响,特别是索赔的跳跃强度对投资策略与风险控制策略分别呈现差异性影响。

     

    Abstract: We study the stationary time-consistent Nash equilibrium of the optimal investment and risk control problem for many competitive insurers under mean-variance criterion involving the relative performance of terminal wealth. The surplus wealth processes of insurers are described as heterogeneous compound Poisson jump-diffusion models with common noise. Each insurer aims to determine an optimal investment and risk control strategy that maximizes her relative wealth under mean-variance criterion. We first establish the stationary Nash equilibrium for finite ninsurer game, and then find the mean field equilibrium as the number of insurers tends to infinity using the mean field game approach. Lastly, we present numerical analyses to illustrate the impact of market model parameters on Nash equilibrium strategies. The result indicates that the intensity of claim jumps has contrasting effects on investment and risk control strategies.

     

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